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Key points:
- SB 62 showed that adaptation finance risks becoming a major problem for COP 30 with signs of negative NCQG dynamics emerging.
- Meaningful advances on finance at previous COPs have required active Presidency engagement.
- Brazil should actively promote an ambitious adaptation finance narrative that presents the roles of different Parties and sources of finance as additive and complementary, rather than in opposition.
- Brazil can build political momentum to unlock negotiations by securing adaptation finance announcements from developed countries who are already due to renew their climate finance commitments.
Heading into SB 62, adaptation was squarely in the spotlight. The COP 30 Presidency’s third letter had reinforced that Parties had to agree on guidance for refining the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) indicators. Exactly how adaptation finance would feature, however, was unclear. But the question was quickly answered with adaptation emerging as a key theme in the formal finance agenda and finance became a sticking point across the adaptation negotiations. The drama of HoDs negotiating guidance for GGA finance indicators late into the final night is the lasting image of SB 62 and will likely set the tone for what’s to come at COP 30.
Adaptation: new finance focus, same finance problems
While 2025 has a new focus on adaptation, the issues regarding adaptation finance were uncomfortably reminiscent of NCQG negotiations. In particular, Parties were stuck disagreeing on references to adaptation finance sources, contributors, and instruments.
In negotiations on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Parties remained gridlocked over how to reference the financial and technical support, and the responsibilities of developed countries versus other Parties.
In the GGA negotiations, Parties struggled to land guidance on refining finance indicators that did not cross each other’s red lines. For the EU and Umbrella Group countries, that line appears to be bringing bifurcated party responsibilities into the GGA, given Article 7 of the Paris Agreement itself does not. They also demand attention to the important role of sources of adaptation finance other than that provided under Article 9. The G77+China, however, demanded a focus on the provision of finance by developed countries and rejected references of domestic public finance, which they argue could dilute the accountability of developed countries. A Group SUR placeholder for a new collective adaptation finance goal also made it into the informal note – a matter likely to be very contentious at COP 30.
Finance provision is key for adaptation, for which it is relatively harder to mobilise private finance. Concerns over developed countries’ finance provision commitments fueled debates on adding Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement to the agenda in Bonn. Negotiations on the Adaptation Fund stalled over a related issue: the potential updating of terminology/country classification for Board Members and Parties as the Fund transitions to only serve the Paris Agreement.
The one bright spot for adaptation finance at SB 62 came during the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue workshop focusing on Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement. The workshop strongly focused on adaptation, and Parties widely supported maintaining this emphasis as they prepare to negotiate future CMA work on aligning global finance with low-emission and climate-resilient development.
Taken as a whole, however, the warning signs should be flashing for the COP 30 Presidency regarding adaptation finance. Parties barely left Bonn with the minimum GGA outcome because of it. If Brazil is not careful, they could have a mini-NCQG negotiation on their hands in Belem – something anyone seeking ambition should avoid
Getting ahead of the game: why finance outcomes cannot be left to the last minute
Recent COPs have shown that constructive progress on fundamental finance issues requires political momentum and early Presidency leadership in negotiations. The same is likely true for adaptation finance at COP 30.
Unlike other topics such as adaptation or mitigation, UNFCCC finance negotiations are uniquely oppositional due to the stronger bifurcation of legal responsibilities between developed and developing countries. This is further exacerbated by sensitivities regarding special circumstances and the enormous challenge many developed countries face in financing their climate strategies. Genuine bridging of positions doesn’t come easily, especially after three years of NCQG deliberations saw Parties retrench into their positions rather than come together.
Advances with finance have often required strong leadership from the top. COP 26 saw relentless advocacy from the UK as incoming President on both new NDCs and climate finance commitments – and they got both. The ‘doubling’ outcome for adaptation finance was an active insertion from the Presidency and only possible in the context of new multi-year climate finance commitments having already been secured. At COP 28, the UAE had to be actively engaged in the Global Stocktake negotiations to find an acceptable balance among the competing finance priorities.
At COP 29 we saw a different story. Its Presidency actively stayed out of the NCQG negotiations until the final moment. By then, the window of possibility had already narrowed and trust was almost exhausted. When they finally tried to push for an outcome, ambition was already off the table.
While logistics are a persistent issue, Brazil still holds trust in Parties regarding their ability to steer the negotiations at COP 30. The task in Belém will differ from Dubai or Baku in that adaptation finance is neither part of a wide-ranging GST decision or a singular item as was the NCQG. However, the broad lesson is the same: Brazil needs to enter and actively shape the finance discussion while the possibility for an ambitious adaptation package is still on the table.
Opportunities: How the COP 30 Presidency can set the table for an ambitious but balanced adaptation finance outcome in Belém
After stepping in during the final stages of SB 62 to land the GGA conclusion, the stage is now set for Brazil to play a more active role in shaping the tone of negotiations. Through its Presidency letters and public statements, Brazil should promote a narrative articulating an ambitious but balanced set of adaptation finance outcomes at COP 30.
This narrative should be steadfast regarding the legal responsibilities of developed countries to provide adaptation finance but also be ambitious in encouraging voluntary contributions from other wealthy, high-emissions countries. It should stress the central role of grants and highly concessional public finance, while also highlighting opportunities for the private sector to scale adaptation investments aligned with NAPs and NDCs. The importance of domestic public investments in resilience should be highlighted, while simultaneously stressing the need for debt relief and fiscal space. The narrative can support creating enabling policy environments to attract investment while also firmly rejecting the imposition of new funding conditionalities. In short, these different pathways towards adaptation finance can be complementary rather than in opposition. Public and private, domestic and international: these qualifiers should be additive and build ambition for adaptation finance rather than be used to point fingers or deflect responsibility.
Brazil should begin telling this story through their public statements and Presidency letters. Their presentation of the Baku to Belém Roadmap is then a critical moment to present it in an official outcome for COP 30. Properly articulated, this narrative can set the table for negotiators to find language that reflects it and navigates the impasses encountered at SB 62.
But nice words will not be enough without political momentum behind them. For this, the COP 30 Presidency should look to the many developed countries whose current multi-year climate finance commitments expire in 2025 or early 2026. While recent ODA cuts have reduced the total fiscal envelope in the short term, there remains a real opportunity to advocate for continued prioritisation of climate, and particularly adaptation.
Countries such as the UK, Canada, France, Ireland, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand should be asked to update their climate finance commitments ahead of COP 30 and include their own adaptation sub-target. These countries are already due to make such updates and have prioritised adaptation within their previous climate finance commitments. Specific pledges to the Adaptation Fund should also be sought to ensure continuity of programming until Article 6.4 share of proceeds become available next year. Even if the size of commitments is reduced in the current geopolitical context, renewing commitments to adaptation finance is critical to begin rebuilding trust and ensure a minimum level of predictability of support for developing countries.
Conclusion: finance has adaptation in gridlock, but Brazil holds the keys
Adaptation will be a central story of COP 30, and success depends on unlocking negotiations on adaptation finance. However, the NCQG showed that Parties will not build bridges to ambition on finance if left to their own devices. Brazil has an opportunity to build on its emergent role from SB 62 and bring leadership to this vital issue. If they act earlier and promote an inclusive, ambitious finance narrative, they can shift the window of possibilities towards ambition. And with an ambitious Roadmap and concerted effort to secure renewed finance commitments, they can generate the political momentum to turn these possibilities into reality.
